The Death of Live Broadcasting: From “Internet Celebrity Economy” to “Platform Scene” | macauslot188, judibola

Live streaming will exist for a long time, but the live streaming platform may not.

Under the cold winter of capital, Douyu held on to the last ticket in its hands. After the news of going public in the United States was finalized, everyone in the company breathed a sigh of relief. On the other side, Panda, whose capital chain was broken for 22 months, has come to its end and launched the "Main Site Wandering Plan". In the unsupervised countdown, the platform is filled with a doomsday sense of carnival and indulgence, mixed with a sense of tragedy like a sinking ship.

The ending of the story has long been determined. Since the "Thousand Broadcast War" began in 2016, most platforms will inevitably become cannon fodder. Different from the hot air blown by some capital, live broadcast is indeed a business that can stand the test of time.

Counting from the beginning of the PC era, "Jiujiu Qingyuan" (later renamed 9158), which was born in 2005, should be regarded as the originator of the domestic live broadcast industry, not to mention the emergence of big names like Huanju Times. According to Li Xueling, its chairman and acting CEO, live broadcast itself is a very complete business model, with less interruption to users and an advanced monetization model, which has changed the Internet industry's traditional advertising-based monetization method.

In the mobile era, live broadcasting has begun a new round of evolution of product forms, opening the door to the pan-entertainment era and expanding its tentacles to e-commerce, social networking, shows, games and other fields. Judging from the financial report data of YY, Momo and Huya, live broadcasting products in the mobile era have also run through their own financial models.

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As of the end of 2018, although Panda Live’s DAU dropped from 2.7 million at the end of 2017 to 2.3 million, it still ranked high in the entire live broadcast arena, especially in the subdivision of game live broadcast, second only to Douyu and Huya. Therefore, Panda’s collapse triggered not only operational discussions at the individual level of the company, but also the hearts and minds of the entire industry.

The rise and fall of Panda Live is full of drama. The rise process is very consistent with the three principles of "Tipping Point": the law of individual characters, the law of adhesion and the power of the environment. Under the power of Wang Sicong and his capital, various celebrities and big Vs came to the platform. Panda Live rose like lightning and quickly became the third largest player in the game live streaming industry. With the arrival of the industry reshuffle period, Panda has no news of financing since the completion of Series B financing in May 2017. Especially in 2018, Panda was caught in a series of negative news such as wage arrears and capital chain breaks. Panda, which failed to raise funds, finally couldn't sustain it anymore, and finally chose to officially announce its closure on March 8, 2019, Women's Day.

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Before Douyu’s ceiling, Panda will not be the last player to fall

History is often full of black humor. In fact, the ending of Panda Live was already doomed a year before its official announcement. On March 8 last year, Douyu and Huya received exclusive investments of US$630 million and US$460 million from Tencent on the same day. Since then, Huya has successfully completed its listing, while Douyu has no news of financing. On the game live broadcast track, Tencent has announced the end of the network this time. These two investments are just two tickets to land. The rest are still struggling, but they have been sentenced to probation.

The business world is turbulent and no one wants to give up until the last moment, but the situation is already very clear. After Huya goes public, Douyu will be the ceiling for all remaining players. If Douyu can complete its IPO as soon as possible, then the remaining players will still have a chance to give it a try

Otherwise, the longer Douyu delays, the other people will be consumed to death under the huge cash flow pressure.

History has not given room for miracles in the end. 2018 was a bad year for the live broadcast industry. Three big mountains came to the top, directly compressing the survival space of the entire industry and accelerating the process of industry elimination.

1. The traffic black hole of short videos also sucks away users of live broadcasts

The rapid rise of short videos in 2018 and their ability to attract traffic were unexpected. The competition between Douyin in the south and Kuaishou in the north has taken away a lot of users' attention. On the battlefield of time, one is ebbing and the other is ebbing. Users who are tired of live broadcasts are attracted by short videos. According to data from the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), as of December 2018, the number of online live broadcast users reached 397 million, a decrease of 25.33 million from the end of 2017, and the user utilization rate dropped by 6.8%. At the same time, the number of short video users reached 648 million during the same period, nearly twice the former, and the user utilization rate was also as high as 78.2%. In the second half of 2018, the user scale growth rate reached 9.1%.

In terms of product form, short videos are more fragmented and faster than live broadcasts. An interval of 15 seconds can stimulate adrenaline, and the content form is richer and more controllable. For users, instead of staring at a beautiful woman and watching her sing and dance live, it is better to keep scrolling and watch countless singing and dancing videos carefully recorded by young ladies. In terms of the pleasure of power, the former requires rewards to make the other party act according to their own will, and there is also a competitive relationship. The latter does not cost a penny, and the platform will automatically push the videos they like through algorithms.

Both are pan-entertainment platforms, short videos and live broadcasts actually compete for the same group of users. What’s more, in the battlefield of time, the traffic black hole formed by short videos is a threat to all platforms. Previously, QuestMobile data also showed that short video user usage time has surpassed long videos, becoming the second largest category after instant messaging. Even WeChat feels a sense of crisis, not to mention live broadcast platforms with lower user viscosity.

2. The Sword of Damocles under strict supervision

MC Tianyou, a great star in the live broadcasting industry who became famous with his song "Drunk by Drinking", ushered in the Waterloo of his career at the beginning of 2018. On February 12, 2018, Tianyou described drug abuse in detail in the form of a rap during a live broadcast. He was subsequently named and criticized by Focus Interview, and was banned across platforms by the Cyberspace Administration of China in conjunction with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. In addition to banning Tianyou, the Cyberspace Administration also shut down 10 illegal live broadcast platforms, including Honey Live.

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2018 is a year of supervision. Under high pressure and rules, there are constant news of interviews, self-examinations, rectifications, closures, and removals. Industry powerhouses such as Douyu and Huya have been punished to varying degrees. This has made live broadcasts even more constrained in content creation and display, lest they go too far. At the same time, the gaming field has also ushered in an industry regulatory freeze. Version numbers have been restricted. The number of newly launched games has dropped by more than half compared with the previous year. Monthly active users have even experienced negative growth since November. Under dual supervision, the development of game live streaming platforms has been greatly slowed down.

3. The shortage of food and grass in the cold winter of capital

Under the capital winter of 2018, new economy companies started a wave of listings, even if they were bloody. In the live broadcast track, even if Huya and Inke were finally successfully listed, their market value fell into a downturn. Under the influence of the Matthew Effect, in the second half of 2018, a large number of mid-to-late live streaming platforms either went bankrupt or were acquired. Even leading platforms like Douyu have fallen into a vortex of public opinion such as capital chain breaks, office closures, and layoffs.

When the team was disbanded, Panda Live COO Chen Juyuan attributed the failure mainly to the break in the capital chain. "Since the last financing news in May 2017, we have not had any external capital injection for 22 months. Management The management has been trying continuously in the past two years and tried their best to find at least five potential investors and various solutions. Unfortunately, the funding gap was not solved in the end.” According to media investigation reports, Panda also searched for a sale in 2018 to no avail.

In the three buildingsUnder the pressure of the mountain, the entire live broadcast industry faced the cold winter in 2018. It was a race against time. Douyu failed to jump over the dragon gate and cut off the last hope of other platforms. Now Douyu has a ticket to go to the U.S. for its IPO, but others that have not landed may never come ashore again.

Looking at the collapse of Panda from this perspective, whether it is the slow transformation of the game, the failure of Buddhist management, or the internal friction and corruption of power struggles, they are no longer fatal reasons. Perhaps when Tencent reached out to Douyu and Huya on March 8 last year, other players on the game live broadcast track were already waiting for death. In a losing battle, the unintentional operation of the top management is also reasonable.

The end of the internet celebrity economy and the beginning of the platform scene

As an industrial form of "atypical Internet celebrity economy + content payment", live broadcast is actually very embarrassing.

On the one hand, its business model is very simple and direct. The platform creates anchors, the anchors provide content, and fans pay for the content. The platform then gets a share of the income from rewards and advertising. Drainage and monetization are carried out simultaneously, which can be described as efficient and fast. On the other hand, it does not own the IP of Internet celebrities. The Internet celebrities it cultivates often become wedding dresses for others. Poaching is common among platforms, which can be said to be a big burden on operating costs.

The reason why Panda went bankrupt was essentially because its own hematopoietic ability was insufficient. Once capital stopped transfusing blood, it would be difficult to survive. Single monetization model is almost a common problem of live broadcast platforms. Even though Douyu received strategic investment from Tencent last year, it fell into a crisis of broken capital chain because it could not turn losses into profits. Even if it finally persisted in listing, insufficient hematopoietic capacity was a major hidden danger.

Among the many live broadcast platforms that have suffered losses, gone bankrupt, or are struggling to support themselves, YY, Huya and Momo can be regarded as outliers.

According to the 2018 full-year financial report, Huya achieved total revenue of 4.663 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 113.4%; YY achieved total revenue of 15.764 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 36%; Momo achieved total revenue of 13.408 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 51%. In terms of profit, not measured in accordance with U.S. GAAP, Momo’s net profit was 3.462 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 39.4%; YY’s net profit was 3.196 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 18.4%; Huya’s net profit was 460 million yuan, compared with a loss of 40.9 million yuan last year.

A careful study of the blood-building methods of the three of them, especially the gameplay of veteran live broadcaster YY and social guru Momo, can bring enlightenment to other players in at least two directions:

1. Expand diversified revenue, consolidate traffic pool, and reduce reliance on live broadcasts

From Q1 to Q4 in 2018, Momo’s live broadcast service revenue accounted for 85.4%, 83%, 76%, and 76.98% of total revenue respectively. The proportion showed a significant decrease. This was mainly due to the rapid growth of value-added service revenue. In Q4 2018, Momo’s value-added service revenue was 722 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of 272%. The expansion of diversified businesses has not only reduced the platform's dependence on live broadcast services, but also further accumulated user traffic. It has contributed greatly to the creation of social scenes. Based on LBS, it has finally formed a variety of audio and video interactive experiences including live broadcasts, short videos, social games, karaoke and other forms.

As Momo President and COO Wang Li said: “Although the vast majority of Momo’s revenue currently comes from live streaming, live streaming accounts for less than 30% of DAU, and more than 70% of users are using other social experiences that have nothing to do with live streaming and talent shows. ”

For the platform, the key is how to bypass Internet celebrity live broadcasts and make fans directly sticky to the platform. Just like an urban complex, users can get a variety of services after coming in. It is the entire platform scene that retains them. Even if one of the businesses is divested, it will still have a strong attraction for users.

2. Expand overseas, go down to villages and towns, and break through boundaries to find traffic

With the peak of domestic traffic dividends, it has become normal for Internet products to choose to go overseas and sink. This is another war between time and efficiency.

As early as 2014, YY began its attempt to expand its business overseas and invested in the video social platform BIGO overseas, becoming one of the first Chinese Internet companies to expand into overseas markets. According to the financial report in March this year, Huanju Times has completed the wholly-owned acquisition of overseas video social platform HAGO. HAGO is a casual game aggregation social platform that integrates multiple real-time games, chat rooms, karaoke and other functions. Since its official launch in the second half of last year, HAGO has 20.9 million monthly active users worldwide, covering 33 countries and regions around the world. Data shows that it has always topped the list of social APPs in the iOS and Android markets in Indonesia and Vietnam.

In addition, Huya and Tentacle are both looking for opportunities overseas, and it has become an inevitable trend to broadcast live broadcasts overseas. With the domestic war situation determined, this will undoubtedly open up a broader battlefield and provide non-leading players with a chance to make a comeback. In addition, the sinking market has not yet been fully developed. Take Inke as an example. According to the 2018 semi-annual report, Inke will invest 100 million in promotional expenses in Focus to promote the sinking of the user-scale market.

In terms of content, live streaming is far from becoming obsolete, but on the commercial battlefield, with the withdrawal of old players such as Panda Live, the future of the live streaming industry has also been questioned. In the world of the live broadcast platform, half is sea water, half is fire, destruction and vitality are intertwined. How far is the next spring?

[Source: Mantis Finance Author: Mu Yu]