Video has a long life, live broadcast has a short life | slot kali 500, rekomendasi slot online terbaik

Panda is dead, Tencent enters the market.

A week ago, before the public mourning for Panda Live Broadcasting dissipated, Tencent launched a live broadcast tool "Tencent Live" for WeChat public accounts.

"The giants are entering the market at this time, and it seems that they want to dominate the live broadcast industry." Tencent's ambition to control the voice of the live broadcast industry is "Sima Zhao's heart, and everyone knows it" - As early as February 14, Tencent issued 12 live broadcast bans, which involved the interests of multiple parties such as live broadcast platforms, anchors, and MCNs.

Since 2016, in addition to building 6 self-built live broadcast platforms, Tencent has directly invested in 4 live broadcast companies. As a content provider in the live broadcast industry and its derivative fields, Tencent is undoubtedly gradually gaining control of the industry and establishing new rules.

Ma Huateng wants to be the king of live broadcasting, but Wang Sicong fails in the diamond rank.

When Wang Sicong debuted with the C position of Panda Live, he experienced the madness of capital and the rectification of the industry, and witnessed the smoke of the Qianbo war, but finally fell on the road to listing. The cold winter of the Internet is so cruel.

Some people say that the four major crimes of "poor management, infighting among senior executives, lack of funds, and unclear positioning" have "killed" pandas, but are pandas not the only ones who have died under these four major crimes?

From 2016 to the beginning of 2019, the live broadcast industry has experienced a "blowout growth--thousand-broadcast melee--a regulatory storm--a period of accelerated reshuffle--an industry adjustment period." Nowadays, capital has become more rational and the industry is in a state of flux.

After sorting out, "Bullet Finance" found that based on the time of entry of live broadcast players, the development of the entire industry can be divided into three major echelons:

Echelon A:Pure live broadcast platforms (Douyu, Inke, Huajiao, Huya, etc.)

Echelon B:Native platform + live broadcast function (Momo, Baidu Tieba, Taobao/Tmall, Tencent, etc.)

C Echelon:Video/short video + live broadcast function (Douyin, Kuaishou, etc.)

Today, three years later, the entire live broadcast industry has undergone dramatic pattern changes: C>B>A The rising stars have almost overwhelmed the forerunners in terms of market share and overall revenue with a "crushing victory".

Perhaps one of the laws of business is that it is constantly changing.

Echelon A: Fire and Ice

“Unexpected, but reasonable.” An industry insider close to Douyu’s live broadcast business said in a confidential manner in the face of the disruptive changes in the industry structure.

Douyu has been hovering in front of the U.S. stock market several times. During this period, it was engaged in offensive and defensive battles with Huya. The drama has been staged for three years. After the crisis of emergency layoffs at the end of last year, it is currentlyPreparing for a US$500 million IPO.

As one of the two live streaming companies that was heavily invested by Tencent on the same day, Douyu’s speed has obviously lagged behind Huya, which just announced full-year profits.

On March 5, Huya announced its 2018 financial report. Its annual operating income was approximately 4.66 billion yuan, and its full-year net profit income was 460 million yuan. In 2018, Q4 revenue was 1.505 billion yuan, of which live broadcast revenue accounted for 95.80%. Live broadcast business has become Huya’s core revenue source.

Since Wang Sicong introduced the "online live broadcast" fire in 2015 and invested in 17 Live Broadcast, the industry has gradually emerged in the past three years. "Ice and Fire": On the one hand, after the Panda National Live Broadcasters struggled hard, they could not help but end up with internal and external troubles; on the other hand, Momo Huya's revenue doubled, and Douyu prepared to swim against the current in the cold winter.

In the past few years when live streaming has become popular, more than 300 live streaming companies have been born in China. This is destined to be a cruel competition to the death.

In fact, before Panda fell, the first live broadcast giant to "announce its death" was "National Live Broadcast", which focuses on game live broadcasts.

National Live Broadcast, launched in 2015, is unparalleled in the limelight and has successively signed well-known game anchors such as Xiaozhi, Dishi and Xiaomo. In September 2016, Quanmin Live received RMB 500 million in Series A financing and spent RMB 300 million to acquire Muyin Live.

According to the statistical data released by iiMedia Consulting in the "China Online Live Broadcasting Market Research Report for the First Half of 2016", in the inventory of popular online live broadcasting anchors in 2016, National Live Broadcasting occupied 7 places among the TOP18, firmly ranking among the top 5 game live broadcasting.

Unfortunately, the good times did not last long. Since the Series A financing, there has been no news of financing for National Live Broadcasting.

Generally speaking, if a live broadcast company wants to break out of the siege, it must rely on continuous capital infusion. Financing capabilities have become the core ability that determines the survival of the live broadcast company. This is destined to "financing, burning money, expansion, lack of money, and death" will become an unavoidable development path for the industry.

During the "Thousand Broadcast War", various companies frantically sought financing, and National Live Broadcasting, which lacked capital support, fell directly to the bottom of the cliff - due to the break in the capital chain, its market share in game live broadcasting and pan-entertainment live broadcasting continued to decline.

"The company has no money, everyone should find a job quickly." In September 2018, Zhang Yunlong, CTO of National Live Broadcasting, only threw these words at a regular meeting of the technical department, declaring the company bankrupt. Subsequently, the controversy of its anchors and employees demanding wages swept the entire network.

National Live Broadcast eventually fell into the smoke of the "Thousand Broadcast War", and founder Wang Aoyan disappeared.

Witnessing the "cruel and bloody" on the battlefield, Han Kun also began to feel anxious. He did not expect that the "social + live broadcast" model he was once proud of would turn Yibo into a back alley.

He founded Yida Technology in August 2011, and subsequently launched three popular products: Miaopai, Xiaoka Show and Yizbo in 2013, 2015 and 2016 respectively. All of them grabbed the "thigh" of Weibo, and the huge user traffic made YidaTechnology has successfully entered the fast lane of development.

These three hot products are actually Han Kun's three-step plan in the fields of content, tools and social networking Judging from his earlier speech, the "social + live broadcast" model he pioneered has been proven by the market to be a correct judgment: when live broadcast platforms are constantly being hunted, Yizhibo is bundled with Weibo, a natural social platform, and users can click live broadcast without downloading an app, which has brought a "Great Leap Forward" growth to Yibbo's business.

But unfortunately, the “fruit of revolution” of the “social + live broadcast” model was later picked away by Tang Yan’s Momo.

At that time, with the support of three popular products, Yiayi Technology completed US$500 million in financing on November 21, 2016. Weibo supported Yiayi Technology for four consecutive rounds and became the largest shareholder outside the founding team. There is even more capital to hope that Yiaxia Technology will be listed in 2017.

The favor of capital makes Han Kun unable to suppress the "joy of success" from the corners of his eyes and eyebrows when he appears in public.

But Han Kun failed to have the last laugh, and the highlight moment of the broadcast also failed to survive until 2018.

Yibo is facing difficulties both internally and externally: In 2017, the "short video + live broadcast" model suddenly emerged. According to Questmobile's 2018 report, the number of users and usage time of short videos exceeded those of live broadcast;

Externally, national regulatory authorities are vigorously rectifying the live broadcast industry.

After many twists and turns, Yizhibo’s vitality has been greatly reduced, and its goal of a separate IPO has also failed. Sometimes it is said that it is "breaking up" with Weibo, and sometimes it is said that it is "selling out" to Weibo...

Looking back at the "ice and fire" in the industry last year: National Live Broadcast was killed, Panda Live was in danger, and Longzhu Live even gave up on game classification like a strong man with his arm broken;

Tencent spent more than 1 billion US dollars in one day to invest in Douyu and Huya and supported their listings, thus controlling the game's promotion channels in disguise;

YY Live still has a place with YY LIVE and Huya, Huajiao can also get blood transfusions with 360, and Yingke, who is working alone, failed to backdoor and hurriedly listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange...

“Some are happy and some are worried”, this is the current situation of the A-tier pure live broadcast platform. Everyone understands that the last straw that breaks the camel's back is the word "profit".

How to maintain profits and reverse losses while burning money like crazy? This is the "question of life and death" of the live broadcast platform.

For pure live streaming platforms, revenue sources are mainly divided into four parts: reward sharing, game interoperability, advertising and member value-added services. Judging from the financial report data released by live broadcast companies such as Huya and Inke, reward sharing is currently the main profit model of live broadcast platforms.

Therefore, the live broadcast business is more like a double-edged sword:

On the one hand, the advertising revenue and streaming media live broadcast revenue brought by the live broadcast business have become the company's pillar industries;

On the other hand,Live broadcast companies rely too much on live broadcast business, resulting in a single revenue structure. This will be the biggest hidden danger for companies whose main business is live broadcast. Once problems such as slow user growth or top anchors jumping ship, it will directly affect the company's revenue.

“The anchor is the content, the content is the traffic, and the traffic is the monetization” is the business logic of the live broadcast industry.

When the foundation of a business monetization lies in "people", the variables are too large and are uncontrollable factors. This is equivalent to the "product" or "cash cow" on the live broadcast platform being the anchors. Once they leave a certain platform, they will directly take away part of the user traffic.

At the same time, the ability of top anchors to attract money is amazing, but the signing cost is also terrifyingly high. For example, when a DNF game anchor signed a contract with Douyu, the fee was as high as 130 million, which is comparable to the salary of a first-line movie star.

During the "Thousand Broadcast War", each platform, after raising a large amount of financing, spent a lot of money to poach popular anchors for the sake of beautiful data, which pushed this trend to the commanding heights.

What’s even more cruel is that the reward share and user traffic of the live broadcast platform are concentrated on the top anchors, and small and medium-sized anchors can get very little traffic and revenue. In order to obtain greater profits, the platform can only spend a lot of money to poach people and drive up prices... The live broadcast industry has fallen into a vicious cycle.

In addition, reality show live broadcasts have always been more popular than game live broadcasts, with greater revenue, but also greater risks.

The "2017 China Online Performance (Live Broadcasting) Development Report" jointly released by China Entertainment Think Tank shows that as of the end of December 2017, among the number of users in the field of online live broadcasting, the number of users of show live broadcasts (reality show live broadcasts) was 312 million, and the number of game live broadcasts was 247 million.

Since the country has focused on rectifying reality show live broadcasts, the growth rate and usage rate of live broadcasts have both declined.

According to the "CNNIC's 43rd China Internet Development Statistical Report", from December 2017 to December 2018, the annual growth rate of live broadcast was -6%, becoming the only declining type among all Internet applications. Among them, the usage rate of reality show live broadcast dropped by 8.8%. Only the usage rate of game live broadcast remained stable. However, the single user reward payment rate of game live broadcast is far lower than that of reality show live broadcast.

In addition, high bandwidth costs are also one of the reasons that hinder the profitability of game live broadcasts. Compared with reality show live broadcasts, game live broadcasts usually require higher resolutions, which puts a burden on platform bandwidth.

These anchor contracting costs, platform operating costs, bandwidth costs... are all huge sums.

Dong Rongjie knows all this very well. Even though Huya was profitable for the whole year last year, its live broadcast business has entered the existing market, and the ceiling is within reach.

For Huya, it will be even more difficult after its listing. In addition to the game live broadcast business, Huya has begun to get involved in more segmented live broadcast fields, such as "live broadcast + variety show", "live broadcast + travel", "live broadcast + short video", etc.

However, as competition in the live broadcast industry becomes increasingly fierce, the road to content innovation becomes increasingly difficult,“Cross-border integration + seeking diversified development” has become the battlefield that A-tier pure live broadcast platforms are rushing to together.

The market does not have much time left for them. After all, the enemies of the B echelon’s “native platform + live broadcast” are also expanding their territory.

Echelon B: “Cash Cow” and “Life-saving Straw”

In the midfield battle of the live broadcast competition, as a typical representative of the B echelon, Momo may be the biggest winner.

In fact, Momo is not a pure live broadcast company. Everyone knows its "genes", but the live broadcast business has become the magic weapon for Momo's revenue, and live broadcast rewards are its "cash cow".

Relying on the "cash cow" that continuously supplies blood, Momo lives a comfortable life.

On March 12, Momo released its 2018 Q4 and annual report.

Financial reports show that for the full year of 2018, Momo’s net revenue reached RMB 13.4084 billion (approximately US$1.9502 billion), a year-on-year increase of 51%. As of December 2018, Momo’s monthly active users reached 113.3 million. In the same period of 2017, Momo’s monthly active users were 99.1 million.

In the fourth quarter of 2018, the total number of paying users of Momo’s live streaming services and value-added services after deduplication reached 13 million (including 3.9 million Tantan paying users), which shows that Momo’s live streaming business is growing positively.

From the perspective of revenue composition, Momo’s revenue mainly comes from four business segments: live broadcast services, value-added services, mobile marketing services, and mobile game revenue. Among them, Momo’s live broadcast service revenue in Q4 2018 was US$430 million, a year-on-year increase of 31.2%, accounting for 77%, and is Momo’s largest revenue segment.

No wonder, at last year’s company annual meeting, Momo’s benefits to its employees were a New Year’s bag worth 10,000 yuan, plus an international travel award, which turned out to be “enriching the food bank.”

As everyone knows, three years ago, the live broadcast business was "a life-saving straw" for Momo.

In 2016, Momo had been listed for two years. Due to business bottlenecks, it fell in the U.S. stock market. After planning and abandoning privatization, the stock price continued to fall from highs. At that time, Momo was experiencing twists and turns, and its fate was worrying.

“We went public when the curve was at its most beautiful. After that, the Internet dividend disappeared, the river stopped flowing, and we were unable to make breakthroughs in products. Overall, we reached a bottleneck period. "Tang Yan doesn't want to think too much about those gloomy days. For him, the most urgent thing at that time was to explore Momo's next breakthrough.

Under the dual pressure of product performance and capital market, Tang Yan’s “counterattack” for Momo is to enter the most popular live broadcast track.

In fact, Tang Yan launched a live broadcast business in the fourth quarter of 2015 to "test the waters" - upgrading the PGC model of Momo's live channel to a UGC model of amateur live broadcast.

In 2016, the "Thousand Broadcast War" has begun to take shape. The pursuit of capital and the carnival of the whole industry have promoted the trend of "cooking oil" - game live broadcasts, reality show live broadcasts, and sports live broadcasts have always been dominated by the male market. Among them, Douyu, Huya, and Longzhu are the leading players. Together with the new "players", they are burning money like crazy, poaching popular anchors, and harvesting user traffic;

New amateur live broadcast models such as Huajiao, Inke, Meipai Live, etc. have directly filled the gap in female live broadcasts. E-commerce live broadcasts such as Taobao Live and Jumei Youpin have entered the market and occupied the female market...

After truly entering the live broadcast track, what opportunities does the market leave for Momo?

Compared with the A-tier pure live broadcast platform, Tang Yan’s Momo has a “killer trump card” – unique platform attributes and user social atmosphere. After the launch of Momo’s live broadcast business, users’ willingness to spend and pay rewards were actually higher than everyone expected.

In the 2016 annual report, live broadcast revenue accounted for 30.65%, 58.48%, 69.17%, and 79.15% of Momo's overall revenue in the four quarters, respectively, making it the absolute source of revenue for Momo.

There is no doubt that since 2016, Momo has become a company highly dependent on live broadcast business.

According to Momo’s previous annual reports, the total revenue in 2016 was 553.1 million yuan, the total revenue in 2017 was 8.883 billion yuan, and the total revenue in 2018 was 13.41 billion yuan - in comparison, the revenue in 2018 increased by about 24 times compared with 2016.

The live broadcast is the biggest contributor to saving Momo from danger, and now it also helps Momo make a lot of money.

However, for Momo, live broadcast is just part of the video social strategy. In addition to bringing cash flow, the more profound value of live broadcast to Momo may be to win more user retention time, increase user activity and improve social efficiency.

In the final analysis, Momo has completed a "thrilling turn" by relying on live broadcasting - getting rid of the label of "functional tool" and realizing the transformation from a location-based social platform to a pan-entertainment video social platform.

As we all know, game revenue accounts for half of Tencent's total revenue. Tencent is China's largest game company, but it is not a game company, but a social company.

Similarly, when live broadcasting is only a new function that empowers native platforms, Momo is not a pure live broadcasting company. It is not a direct competitor of Huya, Inke, Douyu or YY. It is more of a social platform with three major attributes: LBS, video and entertainment.

Momo gained new vitality through live broadcast. Tang Yan finally breathed a sigh of relief, but he couldn't sit back and relax.

In the B echelon, Alibaba and Tencent are the most powerful opponents. Chinese consumers turn on their mobile phones every day and spend more than half of their time "freely browsing and consuming" within the territory of the BAT empire. They occupy the vast majority of user time and traffic.

Taobao and WeChat official accounts have also taken a fancy to the monetization potential of live broadcasting when planning their live streaming business.

Taobao Live has begun to taste the benefits. In 2018, a total of 81 anchors guided annual sales of over 100 million yuan, reaching a peak around Double Eleven. In mid-December last year, Wen Zhong, senior director of Taobao's content ecosystem, said that in the next three years, Taobao Live will drive 500 billion transactions.

Alibaba’s ambitions have always been huge, and Tencent is not to be outdone.

With WeChat’s super traffic, the e-commerce category in WeChat mini programs is growing well, but some developers believe that there is a lack of transaction links, and the live broadcast format is conducive to filling this closed loop, not to mention Tencent’s investment layout in the A-tier and its absolute control over game live broadcasts.

I still remember that Zhang Juyuan, COO of Panda Live, said in an internal letter announcing Panda's collapse: "Live broadcast has entered the worst era, but for giants, it may be the best era."

What’s even worse is that the rise of new platforms such as Kuaishou, Douyin, Huoshan and Xigua Video in the C echelon have formed new traffic gathering places, and users’ attention to live broadcasts has begun to lose.

Echelon B finally took over a piece of territory from echelon A, but they didn’t expect that the more powerful echelon C would come to attack and snipe.

C Echelon: "Tiger's mouth snatching food" continues to happen

"There is an interception in front and a pursuit behind."

Members of the entire C echelon take short video business as the main line of development, and are "assisted" by live broadcast business to form the entire video ecosystem. "Short video + live broadcast" has become a system currently being explored by most live broadcast companies.

However, as the C echelon represented by Douyin, Kuaishou, and Bilibili continue to explore this system in depth, it has also been confirmed from one aspect that this road seems to be full of difficulties.

Currently, the explosive growth of the short video track has caused these platforms to continue to compete for food.

The rise of short videos will have a certain impact on live broadcast platforms. In addition to the industry earthquake caused by short videos, the reshuffle of the live broadcast industry is also intensifying.

Therefore, this is a test for platforms engaged in "short video + live broadcast", but at the same time, both are trying to harvest users and traffic.

Platforms at the top of the echelon are still trying different possibilities.

Station B, which is full of two-dimensional world, is also trying hard to try this possibility. It can be said that the success of Bilibili is inseparable from one person, their investor Chen Rui.

In the business layout and operation model of Bilibili, most of these "designs" are made by Chen Rui. For Xu Yi, an engineering geek, he is more busy with technology. Under the leadership of Chen Rui, B Station gradually got on the right track and finally went public.

Currently, the two core businesses of Station B are mobile games and live broadcasting.

Looking at Station B’s 2018 financial report, its total revenue reached 4.13 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 67%, of which revenue in the fourth quarter was 1.16 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 57%.

Although it can be seen intuitively from the financial report that Bilibili’s revenue is constantly increasing.growth, but in fact all its indicators show a downward or slowing trend.

According to the financial report, the current total cash, cash equivalents and time deposits of Station B are 4.3 billion yuan. Excluding employee equity incentive costs, Station B's adjusted non-GAAP net loss in the fourth quarter was 150 million yuan, with a net loss rate of 13%.

In addition, the profit attributable to the parent company in 2018 was -551.7 million yuan, which was an increase compared with the "Thousand Broadcast War" period in 2016, but the growth rate was not obvious.

In terms of assets and liabilities, Bilibili’s total liabilities reached 3.299 billion in 2018, an increase of nearly 2 billion compared with the same period last year.

Currently, Bilibili’s main business consists of four major segments: mobile games, live streaming, advertising, and other revenue, accounting for respectively. According to the revenue of each business, although they have achieved year-on-year growth,but the game business is still the largest core of Bilibili, and live broadcast is behind the game and ranks second in core revenue.

In 2018, Station B’s live broadcast and value-added service business revenue reached 200 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of 276%.

Based on Bullet Finance's comparison of the live broadcast business of Station B in the previous two quarters, the revenue of Station B's live broadcast and value-added services business in Q3 was 170 million yuan in the third quarter, a year-on-year increase of 292%.

Q2 quarter live broadcast and value-added service revenue was approximately 119 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of 186%, accounting for approximately 11.55% of total revenue.

It can be seen from this that from Q2 to Q3, Station B’s live broadcast and value-added service revenue grew close to 50 million, which is an astonishing rate in the overall industry, but the revenue growth rate of its two core businesses has begun to slow down.

It can be seen from the current financial report of Bilibili that although its user scale is relatively large, judging from the current revenue and debt situation, the revenue-generating ability of Bilibili users is still insufficient.

In the "short video + live broadcast" track, in addition to Douyin, the leaders of Bilibili and Kuaishou are all engineering geeks, which is quite comical.

In the view of Zhang Nan, general manager of Douyin, Douyin is actually very simple. It is a product related to "beautiful feelings". "Douyin is essentially a product that upgrades short video consumption. I think the reason why Douyin has been recognized by users is because the time has come and users need a product that can give them a 'good feeling'."

Zhang Nan feels that the amount of information that short videos can contain is actually very rich, but the mainstream short video products at the time were relatively simple in expressing the video and lacked guidance. "If our product can allow users to experience the surprise brought by the beauty of short videos, there should be a chance to gain user recognition."

The "2018 Douyin Big Data Report" released by Douyin shows that as of the end of 2018, Douyin's domestic users checked in 260 million times throughout the year, covering 233 countries and regions.

For Douyin, low threshold is one of the key points for it to continue to detonate content. Short videos focus on light content, while long videos are slow and slow.

Douyin’s fame in the short video industry is inseparable from Bytedance’s traffic position.At a glance, from text to graphics to short videos and live broadcasts, it covers many important platforms that can monetize traffic.

Douyin still values short videos, and live streaming is its second entrance to attract traffic. This is one of the reasons why Douyin does not have a homepage or categories. Recommendations, live broadcasts, and searches are all in inconspicuous places. Its ultimate purpose is to allow users to have entertainment as soon as they open the APP.

Therefore, Douyin decentralizes its short video content distribution and production mechanism. It ensures the continuous output of content by signing Internet celebrities and anchors, and monetizes it through advertising monetization and other methods. It actually uses big data to drive the distribution mechanism, and it will push you what you are interested in.

But at the same time, Douyin also has worrying aspects. In today's world where short videos are becoming more and more homogeneous, how to ensure that the "life" is not taken away by another opponent in the future, how to increase user stickiness and how to monetize it commercially are the concerns of every short video platform.

Therefore, what Douyin needs to explore and change in the future is how to provide users with more other services, including how to bring new value and indispensable new content to users.

In addition to Douyin and Bilibili, Kuaishou is also the leader in the "short video + live broadcast" track.

But Kuaishou is different from the two. In terms of content, Kuaishou seems to be "garlic-eating", while Douyin and Bilibili are "coffee-drinking".

From the theory of "garlic" and "coffee", it is not difficult to see the differences between the three. One is earthy and the other is foreign, and the circles are also very different.

Under different content distribution and operation ideas, Kuaishou is more like a position to record the lives of ordinary people, while Douyin is more like a position to record the lives of Internet celebrities.

I believe everyone must still remember "MC Tianyou". He started from Kuaishou, and this has to be attributed to Kuaishou's shouting culture.

To a certain extent, Kuaishou's civilian policy has brought a certain amount of traffic revenue and popularity to these people. It also shows that most of Kuaishou's anchors come from third- and fourth-tier towns and villages, and the core of their content is the Shoumai and TuHigh series.

Comparing Douyin and Bilibili, they are completely different in content.

Douyin appears to be more "luxurious", with more exquisite housing, bustling cities and modern spaces. In addition, in terms of talent display, it is different from the "local flavor" of Kuaishou. Douyin appears to be more "modern", such as music, calligraphy, travel, and many young people post their emotional life and feelings on Douyin.

Station B is more "two-dimensional", with more two-dimensional animations and cosplay scenes, and a combination of personal and professional artistic performances.

The content of the live broadcasts of these three short video platforms are all close to their respective labels. Station B is close to the second dimension, Douyin is close to art performance, and Kuaishou is close to life. This shows the importance of platform attributes.

Currently, Douyin and Kuaishou are still further carving up the domestic short video market, and their content and user overlap will converge. In the future, we don’t know whether the two will reach the same destination by different paths.You know it.

But for live broadcasts, supervision has always been one of the most critical cores of these platforms. Compared with short videos that have review steps, live broadcasts cannot achieve this process.

In February 2018, CCTV Focus Interview broadcast a program titled "Crackdown on Internet Chaos", which exposed the chaos existing in online live broadcasts. It mentioned that there are problems with minors tipping people and illegal videos involving pornography and drugs on the live broadcast platform.

Live broadcast is indeed more difficult than video. If you are not careful, you may fall into a "dangerous" situation. Compared with video, live broadcast has too many constraints and risks.

The live broadcast track of "Three Points of the World"

The live broadcast track has become "three-thirds of the world".

With the popularity of the "Thousand Broadcasts War" in 2016, it only took more than three years for the "Hundred Broadcasts War" to become cold in 2019.

In the past three years or so, the industry has undergone "world-wide changes".

According to the 2019 CNNIC data report, in the live broadcast segment, in addition to the stable game live broadcast, the user utilization rate of reality show live broadcast dropped by 8.8% compared with the same period in 2017, reaching 19.7%. However, the number of users in the short video field has reached 648 million, with a user utilization rate of 78.2%.

This shows that the proportion of live broadcasts represented by reality shows is constantly declining, which has a certain relationship with the state's control of live broadcasts in recent years. However, the user utilization rate in the short video field is far higher than the live broadcast user utilization rate, with a difference of nearly 4 times.

This has something to do with the gradual maturity of the short video market and the increasing professionalism of content production. There are also certain changes in how users watch video content. More and more people pay more attention to the video content itself.

Therefore, high-quality short video content will become the core competitiveness of each platform.

As one of the three forms of video, live broadcast is still an indispensable part of the rich content ecology of large platforms. The trend of videoization has become unstoppable. Therefore, when users want to publish content on short video platforms, they can directly choose live broadcast, but live broadcast is not their main focus.

In the video field, the threshold for short videos is relatively low. Users can shoot, produce and upload short videos using mobile devices. In terms of content, videos are more intuitive and easier to understand than text compared to pictures.

Text is the carrier of language, which requires further transformation in reading to understand its meaning. However, short videos are relatively intuitive and can be understood after almost one viewing.

In addition, among contemporary young people, life is highly fragmented, and entertainment and leisure activities are completed in these spare fragments of time. Therefore, combined with fragmented scenes, this is the advantage of short videos over long videos.

For Internet live broadcast platforms, user scale and user stickiness are always the most important indicators of platform development. Currently, user stickiness to the platform is divided into three categories.

The first type relies on content to attract user stickiness, such as long-form video platforms such as iQiyi and Tencent Video.

The second category relies onAnchors are used to attract user stickiness, such as Huya, Inke, Panda, and Douyu.

The third category uses cultural spirit to attract user stickiness, such as Station B and Station A.

In the view of Li Xueling, chairman of Joyful Times, live streaming itself is a very complete business model. “Live streaming is more advanced than advertising as a monetization method, because live streaming disturbs users very little.” In addition, he also judged that although most Internet companies currently adopt an advertising model, the user payment model is changing this situation.

Two months ago, Panda Live CEO Zhang Juyuan said at its annual ceremony, "Panda has witnessed the madness of capital, witnessed the smoke of the Qianbo war, and also experienced the cruelty of the Internet winter."

Two months later, Panda Live announced that it would shut down its servers, and the Panda era was far behind us. However, the cruelty of the live broadcast war continued, and it came so fiercely that even Wang Sicong and Zhang Juyuan could not resist it.

After experiencing the Qianbo War, capital has become more rational.

From the bankruptcy of Panda Live, we summarized the reasons: poor management, infighting among senior executives, shortage of funds, and unclear positioning. But in the final analysis,it does not have a main line of business that can be sorted out to achieve sustained revenue. Therefore, for echelon C and echelon B, which have main line business andsustainable monetization capabilities, echelon A is particularly vulnerable.

Not only Panda Live, more live broadcast platforms choose to stay together. Huajiao Live announced its reorganization and merger with Liujianfang. Yibo, a subsidiary of Yizhao Technology, was acquired by Weibo. Both Panda Live and National Live have become cannon fodder in the "National Live Broadcasting Era".

Currently, the top live broadcast platforms have begun to enter the harvest period, but the live broadcast platforms outside the top are becoming increasingly difficult. Is it a merger, a sell-out, or death...

From 2016 to 2019, the live broadcast industry has been devastated. Three years ago, this industry was in full swing and moving forward vigorously. Three years later, this industry is as cold as ice and moving forward cautiously.

What will live streaming look like in three years?

[Source: Bullet Finance Author: Mr. Dan, Yang Bocheng]

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